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The Battle of Pilckem Ridge was the opening attack of the Third Battle of Ypres of the First World War. The battle took place in the Ypres Salient area of the Western Front, between 31 July and 2 August 1917.
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The idea of a Flanders offensive had been in the mind of British commander Sir Douglas Haig for some time before the Battle of Passchendaele. In January 1916, he had ordered plans to be drawn up for an attack in the area.[1] Planning continued but the Battle of Verdun beginning in March 1916 and the demands of the Somme battles later in the year absorbed the British Expeditionary Force's offensive capacity.[2] In December 1916, at the conclusion of the Battle of the Somme, Haig identified Flanders as the most promising theatre for a British offensive in 1917. By 21 June 1917, the principle of a Flanders offensive had met with the grudging approval of Lloyd George and the approval of the British Cabinet.[3][4][5]
In late 1916 and early 1917, military leaders in Britain and France were optimistic that the casualties they had inflicted on the German army at Verdun and on the Somme meant that the German army was near to exhaustion. At the same time, the civilian political leaders of both nations were growing wary of the immense cost to their countries. At a conference in Chantilly in November 1916 and a series of subsequent meetings, the Entente agreed on an offensive strategy where they would overwhelm the Central Powers by means of attacks on the Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts.[6] The British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, sought to find ways of avoiding a repeat of the British casualties involved in the Battle of the Somme and proposed an alternative strategy at a conference in Rome, which would involve an offensive on the Italian front. British and French artillery would be transferred to Italy to add weight to the offensive.[7][8][9] This suggestion was opposed by the French and Italian delegations, as well at the British officers present, at least covertly, and was discarded.[10] The new French Commander-in-Chief, Robert Nivelle, believed that a concentrated attack by French forces on the Western Front in Spring 1917 could break the German front and lead to a decisive victory. Nivelle's plan was welcomed by the British; while many were skeptical that the French would deliver a breakthrough, a French attack would nonetheless mean less of the burden of the war in 1917 falling on the British.[11] Haig was ordered to co-operate with Nivelle's planned attack but secured Nivelle's agreement that in the event the French offensive failed, the British would attack in Flanders.[12]
Several plans for the Ypres offensive were produced between November 1916 and May 1917. Haig first ordered General Sir Hubert Plumer, the commander of the British Second Army which occupied the Ypres salient, to produce an attack plan. Haig was dissatisfied with the limited scope of Plumer's plan for the capture of Messines Ridge and Pilckem Ridge. Plumer produced a revised plan, in which the first stage of the operation would capture Messines and Pilckem while also pushing some distance across the Gheluvelt Plateau. Shortly afterwards, this would be followed by an attack across the Gheluvelt Plateau, advacing to Passchendaele and then further on. Plumer reckoned that a force of 42 divisions and 5,000 guns would be necessary for this but the BEF had nowhere near 5,000 artillery pieces. Haig also asked for an assessment from Colonel Macmullen on his staff, who proposed that the Gheluvelt Plateau be taken by a massed tank attack, reducing the need for artillery; tank experts rejected this idea as utterly impractical. Plumer then produced a second revision of his plan; Messines Ridge would be attacked first, along with the western part of Gheluvelt and then Pilckem Ridge attacked a short while later. The involvement of Henry Rawlinson produced yet another iteration of the plan; Messines alone should be the first target and Gheluvelt and Pilckem Ridge attacked within 47–72 hours.[13]
In April 1917, the French Nivelle Offensive took place, with the main effort by the French on the Aisne, while British and Empire forces undertook a preliminary attack at Arras. The French attack gained ground but at the cost of great casualties and failed to obtain the breakthrough Nivelle had promised; Nivelle was relieved and replaced by Philippe Petain. Over the summer it became clear that the failure of the offensive had caused a collapse in morale amongst French troops.[14] The failure of the French breakthrough attempt meant that any offensive on the Western front would be a largely British affair, as the French were exhausted. British Prime Minister Lloyd George, while still attempting to promote his favoured Italian campaign, had little option but to support Haig's Flanders offensive.[15][16] On 7 May, Haig set the timetable for his Flanders offensive, with 7 June the date for a preliminary attack on Messines Ridge. A week after Messines Ridge was captured, Haig gave his objectives to his Army commanders which were, "wearing out the enemy" and "securing the Belgian coast and connecting with the Dutch frontier" by the capture of Passchendaele Ridge, an advance on Roulers and Operation Hush an attack along the coast with an amphibious landing[17]
On 1 June 1917, General Sir Hubert Gough assumed command of the British Fifth Army, which was now responsible for the Ypres salient north of Messines Ridge. Haig had selected Gough to command the offensive on 30 April but Gough was busy with the British forces south of Arras so delayed his arrival in Ypres until the conclusion of the Second Battle of Bullecourt.[18] Gough immediately set about planning the attack.
Gough's plan involved a preparatory bombardment starting on 16 July and initially scheduled to finish on 25 July. On the 25th, the Second Army would create the impression of a more ambitious attack beyond Messines Ridge by capturing outposts in the Warneton Line, east of the ridge.[19] Fifth Army would attack along a front of about 14,000 yards (13,000 m) together with the French First Army on its northern flank, running from Houthoulst Forest in the north to Kleine Zillebecke in the South, with the main effort on the Gheluvelt Plateau. Their objective on the first day would be an advance of 3,000–3,500 yards (2,700–3,200 m) to the Green Line for consolidation with a possible further advance to the Red Line, a total of 4,000–5,000 yards (3,700–4,600 m), by advanced guards as far as Polygon Wood, Broodseinde and Langemarck depending on German resistance to the principal advance. The attack was designed as an advance in three stages, at any one of which a halt could be called if necessary, while a further line was given for exploitation should German resistance collapse.[20] The decision to advance further was left to the discretion of the division commanders.[21][22]
An attack of this nature was not a breakthrough operation; the German defensive position known as Flandern I lay 10,000–12,000 yards (9,100–11,000 m) behind the front and would not be attacked on the first day.[23] Nonetheless Gough's plan was more ambitious than Plumer's version, which had involved an advance of 1,000–1,750 yards (910–1,600 m). Major-General John Humphrey Davidson wrote a memorandum due to his concern that there was "ambiguity as to what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited objectives" and suggested reverting to the idea of a 1,750 yard advance, to increase the concentration of British artillery.[24] Gough replied to the memo stressing the need to plan for opportunities to take ground left temporarily undefended, before the Germans could recover and that these opportunities were more likely in the first attack which had had long preparation.[25][26] On 30 June, another memorandum was issued by Fifth Army which largely restated the ideas put forward already. It also raised the possibility of, after 36 hours' fighting, open warfare being attained. However, it also stated that "This is... a result which we can hardly hope to attain until the enemy has been beaten in two or three heavy battles."[27]
Gough intended to use nine divisions and one brigade in the Fifth Army, plus two of the French 1st Army and five of the British Second Army. Fifth Army had 752 heavy guns and 1,442 field guns, while they could also count on support from 300 heavy guns and 240 field guns belonging to the French First Army in the north and 112 heavy guns and 210 field guns of Second Army to the south. Gough also intended to use 120 Mark IV tanks to support the attack, with another 48 held in reserve. While Gough had five divisions of cavalry at his disposal, only one brigade was planned to be deployed and that only in the event that the northernmost corps of infantry reached its objectives.[28]
During the preliminary bombardment, the artillery was expected to destroy German strongpoints and trenches, engage in counter-battery fire to suppress German artillery and cut barbed wire entanglements around German positions. On the day of the attack, the first wave of infantry would advance under a creeping barrage advancing 100 yards (91 m) every 4 minutes.[29] They would be followed up by more infantry advancing in columns or artillery formation. To prepare for the attack, the infantry trained on a full-scale replica of the German trench system, which had been pieced together from aerial photographs and trench raids. Specialist platoons were given additional training on methods to destroy German pillboxes and blockhouses.[30]
The attack was delayed on 1 July at the request of General François Anthoine, commander of the French First Army as the French needed more time to prepare artillery emplacements.[31] on 7 July Gough asked for a delay of five days as some of the British heavy artillery had been lost to the German counter-bombardment, some delayed in arriving and bad weather had hampered the program of counter-battery fire.[32] Haig agreed to delay until the 28th. Anthoine then requested another delay because of the poor weather slowing his artillery preparation and after Gough supported Anthoine, Haig reluctantly agreed to delay to 31 July, even though this meant postponing Operation Hush from 7–8 August to the next period of high tides.[33]
Defending German units changed throughout the battle and at various points, consisted of the 3rd Guard Division, 38th Division, 22nd Reserve Division, 10th Bavarian Division, 18th Reserve Division, 16th Division, 32nd Division, 2nd Guard Reserve Division, 12th Division, 207th Division, 221st Division, 235th Division, 52nd Reserve Division, 50th Reserve Division, 111th Division and 23rd Reserve Division.[34][35]
The assault began at 3.50 am on 31 July.[36] The attack was meant to commence at dawn but low cloud meant that it was still dark.[37]
The attack had most success on the left, in front of XIV Corps and the French First Army, which captured Bixschoote. In this section of the front, the Entente forces advanced 3,000–3,500 yards (2,700–3,200 m),[38] up to the line of the Steenbeck river.[39] In the centre of the British attack, XVIII and XIX Corps pushed forward to the line of the Steenbeck to consolidate. XIX Corps then advanced to their Green Line, a total advance of some 3,500 yards (3,200 m), 500 yards (460 m) further than on XVIII Corps's front.[40] XIX Corps then began pushing advanced guards beyond the Zonnebeek - Langemarck road towards the Red Line, an eventual advance of about 4,000 yards (3,700 m).[41] In these areas of the front, the preliminary bombardment had succeeded in destroying the front line of the German position and the creeping barrage was effective in supporting the infantry attack at least as far as the first objective.[39] This meant that the infantry, some supported by tanks, had the strength to deal with German strongpoints encountered after the first line and forward area of resistance had been penetrated and was able to push on towards its further objectives.[42]
The main attack of the offensive by II Corps across the Ghelveult Plateau to the south, was less successful against the principal German defensive concentration of artillery, ground-holding and Eingreif divisions. 8th Division advanced towards Westhoek and took the Blue and Black lines without issue.[43] The southern British flank then became exposed to the concentrated fire of German machine guns from Nonne Boschen and Glencorse Wood.[43] These obstacles had been objectives for 30th Division, on 8th Division's right. 30th Division and 24th Division failed to advance far over boggy ground and because much of the German machine gun defence on this section of the front remained intact.[44] This wasn't known to 8th Division until just before the 25th Brigade was due to advance over Westhoek Ridge. Brigadier General Coffin decided that it was too late to stop the attack and sent a company of the reserve battalion to fill the gap to the south. It was not enough so the Brigade consolidated on the reverse slope and held the crest with Lewis gun posts. Small pockets of ground lost to German counter-attacks were regained by British counter-attacks.[45] The 17th Brigade on the right of 24th Division reached its objective 1,000 yards (910 m) east of Klein Zillebeke. The centre Brigade (73rd) was stopped by German pillboxes at Lower Star Post and 72nd Brigade on the left reached the Bassevillebeek but then had to withdraw to a line south from Bodmin Copse a few hundred yards short of the Blue Line. 30th Division had to advance across the Gheluvelt Plateau and was reinforced by a Brigade of 18th Division.[46] The 21st Brigade on the right lost the barrage crossing the wreckage of Sanctuary Wood and took until 6 a.m. to capture Stirling Castle Ridge. Attempts to advance further were stopped by German machine-gun fire.[47] 90th Brigade to the left was also stopped on the first objective. German artillery fire fell on Sanctuary Wood and Chateau Wood from 05.00 a.m. and succeeded in stopping the advance of the 30th Division, except for a short move forward of about 300 yards (270 m) south of Westhoek. The British artillery barrages made it impossible for German infantry to counter-attack in this area.[48]
The success of the British advance in the centre of the front caused great concern to the German commanders. While the defensive system was designed to deal with some penetration, it was meant to prevent the 4,000-yard advance that XVIII and XIX Corps had achieved. German reserves from the vicinity of Passchendaele were able to launch a counterattack, starting at 11.00 to 11.30 am. The advanced guards facing the counter-attack by 221st and 50th Reserve divisions (Eingreif divisions for Gruppe Ypern) were dispersed and disorganized after dealing with German strongpoints earlier in the morning and could not communicate with their artillery due to the poor visibility and because the Germans added smoke shell to their creeping barrage. The German counter-attack was able to drive the advanced guards back from the Green Line (along the Zonnebeke to Langemarck road) to the Black Line on XIX Corps front and recapture St Julien just west of the Green Line on XVIII Corps front,[49] where the counter-attack was stopped by mud, artillery and machine-gun fire.[50]
The British Official History gives Fifth Army casualties for 31 July to 3 August as 27,001; 3,697 of them killed.[51] Second Army casualties 31 July to 2 August are 4,819; 769 killed. German Fourth Army casualties for 21–31 July were approximately 30,000, excluding wounded whose recovery was to be expected in a reasonable time.[51] The British Official Historian added another 10,000 for this category. The accuracy of casualty statistics of the war has been questioned ever since.
Intended for 9 August to prepare the way for the general offensive due on 13 August but delayed for 24 hours by a thunderstorm on the 8th (with 10mm of rain, after the 25mm which fell between 1 and 4 August),[52] II Corps attacked on the 10th to capture the Gheluvelt Plateau. British artillery fire was distributed across the battlefront for the general attack (eventually made on the 16th) while the Germans concentrated their artillery on the II and XIX Corps fronts. British counter-battery efforts were hampered by the adverse weather, making air observation extremely difficult so much of the effort was wasted by inaccurate fire and an inability to see German artillery shifting position (among three or four alternative emplacements per battery). The state of the ground, German artillery fire and British artillery losses foreshadowed the situation in late October opposite Passchendaele Ridge.[53] 8th and 30th Divisions were relieved by 25th and 18th Divisions by 4 August but this meant that they were exhausted by the 10th. The advance succeeded but German machine-gun and artillery fire and infantry counter-attacks isolated the British infantry of 18th Division, which had captured Glencorse Wood and about 7 p.m. German infantry behind a smokescreen recaptured all but the north-west corner of the Wood.[54]
Only 25th Division's gains on Westhoek Ridge were held.[55] The attacking brigade advanced at 4.25 a.m. fast enough to evade the German barrage on the British front line and reached its objectives by 5.30 a.m. ably assisted by five Royal Field Artillery brigades of artillery. The German garrison of Westhoek was rushed and taken by surprise, while on the right of the attack sniping and attacks by German aircraft caused considerable casualties. The division lost 158 killed, 1,033 wounded and more than 100 missing (most being killed). The difficulties encountered by the 18th Division in Glencorse Wood on the right made consolidation difficult, due to sniping and machine-gun fire. During the day and night of 10/11 August the Germans made several attempts to counter-attack but excellent artillery liaison by SOS signal, daylight lamps, pigeons and runners meant that the guns broke up the German troops in their assembly positions, except for one attack at 7.15 p.m. which was driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire.[56]